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Municipal zoning authorities' are uniquely familiar with the needs
and aspirations of their communities, and for this reason, land use
problems should normally be resolved at the municipal level. Never-
theless, local land use decisions should not be based on exclusively local
criteria; no municipality should be allowed to ignore the impact which
its land use decisions might have on adjoining municipalities,' an
entire region, or even the state itself.
Since existing Washington law does not require a local zoning au-
thority to consider the extra-municipal effects of its land use decisions,
the legitimate concerns of any one municipality may be ignored by a
neighboring municipality, the economic self-interest and legal respon-
sibility of which ends at its jurisdictional border.' This problem will
become more acute as the rapid growth of the state's population4 puts
pressure on zoning authorities to accommodate a growing number of
diverse industrial, commercial, and residential land uses in increasingly
complex patterns.
Many land use decisions have substantial effects on the economies
of neighboring municipalities and the quality of their residents' living
1. Throughout this Comment, "zoning authority" refers to the legislative body of a
local governmental unit, i.e., a city council or a board of county commissioners, as
opposed to a zoning body which has advisory functions like a planning commission, or
recognized administrative or quasi-judicial functions, like a board of adjustment.
2. The term "municipalities" shall in this Comment refer to cities and counties. See
WAsH. REv. CooE § 35.63.010 (1965) and amendments. The reader should keep in mind
that the Optional Municipal Code, WAsH. Rav. CODE § 35A.63 (1967), applies only to
cities.
3. Washington has 39 counties-and 266 incorporated cities at this date.
4. The following table presents the projected population trends for Washington State:





WAsmGToN STATE CENsus BOARD, PoPuLATIoN FORECATBS-STATE op WASHINGTON-
1965-1985, Table 6:1 (1966).
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conditions. For example, the decision to permit construction of a high-
rise apartment building near a municipal border will affect traffic
patterns in neighboring municipalities, forcing them to absorb the
burden of increased traffic." Rezoning to permit a factory or refinery
may obviously have substantial extra-municipal effects, not the least
of which are air and water pollution. A restriction of the density of
dwelling units may upset a neighboring municipality's plans for an
employment center; the prohibition of gas stations may work at odds
with state highway plans. In short, total municipal autonomy in land
use control is obviously contrary to economic and social realities. Of
those land use decisions which have serious extra-municipal effects,
some will have regional impact,6 while others may have state-wide
implications.7
Local freedom in land use control may also have serious social con-
sequences, such as the systematic exclusion of large numbers of people
from certain areas on the basis of economic class or race.8 Minimum
lot requirements, minimum house size requirements, and the whole-
sale exclusion of apartment buildings and industry often operate to
increase property values in selected areas and to keep out the poor
and the black.' These restrictions also stimulate urban sprawl by
5. In Bishop v. Houghton, 69 Wn. 2d 786, 420 P.2d 368 (1966), discussed at notes
138-47 and accompanying text, infra, prospective tenants of the contemplated high-rise
buildings would have had access to their residences only through adjoining municipalities.
Even though these municipalities would bear the burden of providing such access, they
did not participate in the zoning in the first instance nor in the requested rezoning later.
Although residents in these municipalities were allowed to argue their case before the
Houghton Planning Commission and City Council, the question of their standing to
object was not dearly answered on appeal.
6. A land use decision which would permit construction of certain large-scale facil-
ities, such as heavy manufacturing plants, may have regional implications.
7. For example, the control of air and water pollution and the establishment of pat-
terns of population density throughout the state are more than a municipal concern.
8. Washington should not, for example, allow restrictive zoning to perpetuate de
facto economic and racial segregation in the cities and to contribute to industrial sprawl.
9. What restrictions like minimum house size requirements, overly large lot area
regulations and complete limitation of dwellings to single family units really do is
bring about community-wide economic segregation.
Vickers v. Township Comm'n, 37 N.J. 232, 266, 181 A.2d 129, 147 (1962) (dissent),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
Babcock notes that restrictive zoning aimed at the exclusion of small lots and apartment
buildings is contrary to the philosophy which led to our nation's phenomenal growth:
If the Homestead Act had permitted settlement of the West only upon the consent of
the existing residents, the Indians might have been happier, but this would be a much
different country today.
R. BABcocx, THE ZOMNG GA= 149 (1966).
For a recent discussion, see Williams & Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas along
Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. Rrv. 827.
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forcing expanding industries to "hop" from the city center out to the
countryside, bypassing the restrictively zoned residential areas.'0
While it is clear that Washington is in great need of effective land
use planning and control at the regional and state levels, the power
to zone is presently exercised at the municipal level; extra-municipal
planning is implemented, if at all, only by the grace of local zoning
authorities." Therefore, before discussing current extra-municipal plan-
ning in the state of Washington, the topic of Part II, it may be
helpful to outline the legal structure of zoning in Washington to in-
dicate the extent of this local freedom in planning and zoning.
I. LOCAL AUTHORITY TO ZONE
Comprehensive zoning is a constitutionally valid exercise of the
police power 2 of a state or political subdivision thereof.'3 In Wash-
ington, municipal authority to zone is derived either from a direct
grant of police power by the state constitution 4 or from one of three
basic zoning statutes. 5
A. Constitutional Authority
In Washington, first class charter cities may zone independently of
any statutory grant of zoning authority under a constitutional grant of
police powers, when acting pursuant to a valid charter provision.'
10. Bowe, Regional Planning vermus Decentralized Land-Use Controls-Zoning for the
Megopolis, 18 DflP. L. RIv. 144 (1968).
11. For an outline of the various extramunicipal planning agencies see notes 70-95
and accompanying text, infra.
12. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365 (1926) established the con-
stitutionality of comprehensive zoning as a valid exercise of the police power, provided
there is a substantial relationship between the zoning ordinance and the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. See also Jones v. Town of Woodway, 70 Wn. 2d 977,
425 P.2d 904 (1967); McNaughton v. Boeing, 68 Wn. 2d 659, 414 P.2d 778 (1966);
State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn. 2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952).
13. See King County v. Lunn, 32 Wn. 2d 116, 200 P.2d 981 (1948).
14. WAsH CoNsT. art. XI, § 11.
15. WAsH. REv. CODE d. 35.63 (1965) (cities and counties); WAsH. REv. CODE d.
35A.63 (1967) (Code cities) ; and WASH. Rav. CODE ch. 36.70 (1963) (counties).
16. Nelson v. Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 862, 395 P.2d 82 (1964), discussed in notes 22-26 and
accompanying text infra. WAsir. R Y. CODE ch 35.22 (1965) deals generally with first
dass cities.
The Washington legislature has classified cities by population, first class cities having
a population of at least 20,000 inhabitants; cities of the. second class have 10,000-20,000,
third class, 1,500-10,000, and fourth class (towns) 300-1,500. WAsH. REv. CoDE ch.
35.01 (1965). A city with more than 10,000 inhabitants may frame and adopt its own
595
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The constitutional right of qualified municipalities to frame a charter
may not be extinguished by the state legislature; 17 however, the
legislature may control the content of the charter, which must be
"cconsistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of this
state."'
8
First class charter cities have legislative powers as broad as those
of the state except insofar as they contravene the constitution, statutes
or city charter.'9 These powers are not derived from the charter pro-
visions of the constitution, but from article XI, section 11, which
contains a general grant of police powers to municipalities.2 0 However,
"[e]ven the broad powers of first class cities cannot contravene a
state legislative enactment. In short, a Washington statute always
supercedes a conflicting ordinance." 2'
charter. WASH. CO NST. art. XI, § 10, and amend. 40 (1964); the applicable enabling
legislation is WASH. REv. CODE §§ 35.21.600 (1965) and 35.21.610 (1965). The con-
stitutional police power grant is contained in WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
The validity of a 1910 Seattle Charter amendment providing for zoning under a com-
prehensive plan to be drawn up by a municipal planning commission was upheld in
Bussell v. Gill, 58 Wash. 468, 107 P. 1080 (1910); however, this attack on the charter
was not grounded on any alleged exclusion from the police power grant of WASH. CONST.
art. XI, § 11.
17. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WASH.
L. REV. 743, 767 (1963), [hereinafter cited as Trautman], and cases cited therein.
18. WASH. CONsT. art. XI, § 11; see Seattle v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 P. 428 (1893).
19. Neison v. Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 862, 395 P.2d 82 (1964); Lend v. Seattle, 63 Wn.
2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964); Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wn. 2d 617, 328 P.2d 873
(1958). The rule has been referred to as the "Dillon rule." See 1 J. DILLON, ComIrsE-
TARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-51 (5th ed. 1911).
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.570 (1965) states that all charter cities shall have all the
powers conferred on them by state law, and also "such powers as are usually exercised
by municipal corporations of like character and degree." In addition, chapter 35.22 is to
construed liberally. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.900 (1965).
20. Wash. Const. art. XI, § 10 (the charter or "home rule" provision), has been
construed as not self-executing. See, e.g., it re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 P. 1064 (1891) ;
Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash. 17, 42 P. 725 (1895). In Patton v. City of Bellingham, 179
Wash. 566, 38 P.2d 364 (1934), the court stated that "whatever authority the city has
in respect of its police power, it has by virtue of Art. XI, sec. 11, of our constitution,
independent of any statutory grant." Id. at 570, 38 P.2d at 365. See also Detamore v.
Hindly, 83 Wash. 322, 145 P. 462 (1915). For discussion of the cases see Trautman, supra
note 17; Morris, Toward Effective Municipal Zoning, 35 WASH. L. REv. 534 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Morris].
On home rule generally in Washington, see Trautman, supra note 17; Wash. Legislative
Council, Subcommittee on Cities, Towns and Counties, Home Rule for Washington
Cities, Sept. 1957; E. Campbell, Municipal Home Rule, August 6, 1958 (Research Memo
No. 53, Bureau of Governmental Research and Services); BUREAu OF GovERm3,=TAL
RESEARCH AiD SERvIcEs, MuNIciPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 14-17
(Report No. 149, 1962).
21. Trautman, supra note 17, at 178, indicates that the only exceptions to the general
rule of supercession are where the statute violates a restriction imposed on the legislature
by the state constitution, and where there is room for concurrent jurisdiction.
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Nelson v. City of Seattle,2 2 however, rejected the argument that the
zoning enabling statutes23 superceded Seattle's zoning powers under
the general police power grant of the Constitution.24 The city, contrary
to the provisions of that statute, had filed a comprehensive plan
with the city comptroller rather than with the county auditor, and
had approved the plan "in principle" but not by formal enactment of
an ordinance. The court, noting that general laws will not be con-
strued as taking away powers from first class cities by implication 5
and that there had been no express legislative intent to preempt,2 6
held that the challenge to Seattle's power to zone was ill-founded.
If a particular statute gives no express indication that the legislature intended it to
have preemptive effect, the courts must infer the legislative intent from the purpose of
the statute and the circumstances in which it was designed to operate. Lend v. Seattle,
63 Wn. 2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964).
22. 64 Wn. 2d 862, 395 P.2d 82 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Nelson].
23. WASr. REV. CODE § 35.63.100 (1965), the section with which the city had allegedly
failed to comply, provided:
A copy of the ordinance or resolution adopting or embodying [the comprehensive]
plan ... shall be filed with the county auditor ....
This section has since been amended to allow the original of the comprehensive plan of a
city to be filed with the city clerk, and a true copy to be filed with the county auditor.
WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.63.100 (1967). See Shelton v. Bellevue, 73 Wn. 2d 28, 435 P.2d
949 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Shelton].
24. WAsH. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11. See Morris, supra note 20, at 549-50. Before WASH.
REv. CODE ch. 35.63 was enacted in 1935, municipal zoning regulations had been upheld
for fire prevention and health protection, which were clearly within the ambit of the
police powers granted local governments under WAsr. CONST. art XI, § 11. Nolan v.
Blackwell, 123 Wash. 504, 212 P. 1048 (1923); Shepard v. Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 109 P.
1067 (1910) ; Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 25 P. 337 (1890). See Morris, supra note 20.
25. Nelson, 64 Wn. 2d at 867, 395 P.2d at 84-5 (1964). State ex rel. Ennis v. Superior
Court, 153 Wash. 139, 149, 279 P. 601, 604 (1929) explains the special status of first class
cities:
It is evident from the constitution of this state and legislative enactments that, in
Washington, cities of the first class are vested with very extensive powers, and that
under Rem. Comp. Stat, § 8982, supra, the statutes of this state concerning the
same must be liberally construed by the courts for the purpose of carrying out the
manifest intent of the legislature to establish cities of the first class as self governing
bodies . . .
WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.22.900 (1965) sets forth the same rule that powers granted to first
class cities should be liberally construed:
Liberal construction. The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed shall have no application to this chapter, but the same shall be
liberally construed for the purpose of carrying out the objects for which this chapter
is intended.
Correlative to this statutory rule is the rule that statutes taking away powers from
first class cities must be narrowly construed. Thus, a state statute will not be construed
as taking away the existing power of a first class city by implication. See Ayers v.
Tacoma, 6 Wn. 2d 545, 108 P.2d 348 (1940). See also Brennan v. Seattle, 151 Wash. 665,
276 P. 886 (1929).
26. Nelson, 64 Wn. 2d at 867-68, 395 P.2d at 85. WAsr. RFv. CODE § 35.63.020 (1965)
provides that "If any council or board desires to avail itself of the powers conferred by
this chapter it shall create a city or county planning commission ...
597
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A question not resolved by Nelson is the status of zoning schemes
of municipalities other than first class charter cities which purport to
exercise zoning powers under the constitutional grant and not under
a statutory grant 7 An argument might be made that article XI, sec-
tion 11 does not distinguish between classes of cities and that Nelson
27. It would seem that the same policy considerations which led the court to allow
a relatively larger degree of independence to first class cities will likewise apply to those
municipalities which are not first class cities but which are chartered or have chosen to
operate under the Optional Municipal Code. It should be noted that this Comment does
not attack the freedom of municipalities to choose the method by which they plan and
zone; rather, it is addressed to the absence of meaningful state and regional controls over
the substance of local land use control measures.
A home rule charter was adopted by King County on November 5, 1968, effective
May 1, 1969, under the 21st amendment of the WASHINGTON CONSTITUTON. This charter
established zoning procedures which are much different than those authorized by statute.
See notes 32-38, and 52-62 and accompanying text, infra. The County Council "shall
adopt by ordinance comprehensive plans" for development. KING COuNTY, WAS~r.,
C nARTER § 220.20. A Department of Planning will prepare and present to the County
Council comprehensive plans for adoption by ordinance with or without amendments. The
Department will also serve in an advisory capacity to various county agencies, coordinate
planning of the county with other governmental agencies, initially consider all zoning
applications, and consider and make recommendations to the County Council on applica-
tions for rezoning or original zoning. Id. § 920.20.70. A public hearing must be held on
proposed ordinances. Id. § 230.10. The county council may adopt by ordinance the rules
of procedure governing the conduct of its hearings, at which a verbatim public record
must be kept. Id. § 220A0. Intergovernmental cooperation is authorized. Id. § 120.
Copies of public records must be furnished for a reasonable fee. Id. § 830.
Cities other than cities of the first class which, under the 40th Amendment, adopt a
city charter, also would arguably have authority to zone under a charter provision in-
stead of an authorizing statute. Cf. BuREAU oF GOVERNmENTAL RESEARCH AND SERVICES,
MVNICuIAL AND REGIONAL PLANNING INi WASIINGTON STATE 2 (Report No. 170, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as BGRS REPORT].
Those non-first class cities which choose to zone under the Optional Municipal Code,
discussed at notes 39 to 51 and accompanying text infra, will have the benefit of a rule
of liberal construction. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.63.130 (1967) provides that where there
are powers under charter provisions which are inconsistent with the Code, Code powers
may nevertheless be exercised by the city. WASH. REv. CoDE § 35A.63.160 (1967) provides
that the Code is
intended to implement and preserve to code cities all powers authorized by Article
XI, section 11 of the Constitution . . . and the provision of this title shall not limit
any code city from exercising its constitutionally granted power to plan for and to
make and enforce within its limits all such local police, santiary, and other regula-
tions in the manner that its charter or ordinance may provide.
Amendment 23 of the WASHINGTON CONSTrrUnoN authorized the legislature to provide
for the formation of a combined city and county municipal corporation when, if formed,
its population would be at least 300,000. Enabling legislation has not yet been passed,
and would probably face strong opposition if introduced. The reasons for this conclusion
include the existing political inertia to change governmental boundaries, the problems of
developing an equitable tax structure, and lack of assurance that all areas which would
best be served by the one government would be included within its boundaries. See
BUREAU OF GOVERNmENTAL RESEARCH AND SERVICES, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMNT IN THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON 281 (Rep. No. 149, 1962).
598
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could therefore apply to all municipalities.2 8 It is probable, however,
that the court will hold that those municipalities which have no charter
"possess only those powers expressly enumerated by statute, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted and those essential to the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation." 29 Statutes describe the general powers of second,
third and fourth class cities and of counties.3 0 These statutes are
strictly construed against the municipality,31 and they do not grant
the power to zone. Therefore, all municipalities, other than those with
authority to zone under valid Home Rule Charters, must zone pursuant
to one of the three Washington statutes which authorize zoning.
B. Statutory Autkority
1. The Planning Commissions Act
Any municipality-city, town or county-may zone under R.C.W.
ch. 35.63,32 which provides for the creation of a planning commission
by those city councils or boards of county commissioners 3 which choose
28. See, e.g., State ex rel. Weiks v. Tumwater, 66 Wn. 2d 33, 400 P.2d 789 (1965),
where the court chose to hold Tumwater's ordinance invalid on the ground of vagueness
rather than on the trial court's determination that Tumwater's power to zone had been
preempted by WASH. REv. CODE ch. 35.63 (1965). And in Lauterbach v. Centralia, 49
Wn. 2d 550, 304 P.2d 656 (1956), the court, ruling that the city could not amend its
zoning ordinance without the recommendation or concurrence of its planning commission
(as provided in WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.120 (1965)), observed that the city had chosen
to operate under the statute and "did not purport to exercise its police power, regardless
of the statute." 49 Wn. 2d at 555, 304 P.2d at 659 (1956).
29. Trautman, supra note 17, at 773. See State ex rel. Winsor v. Ballard, 10 Wash. 4,
7, 38 P. 761, 762 (1894).
Cases applying or approving of this rule include Lauterbach v. Centralia, 49 Wn. 2d
550, 554, 304 P.2d 656, 659 (1956) (dictum, second class cities) ; State ex rel. Cornell v.
Smith, 149 Wash. 173, 178, 270 P. 306, 308, aff'd on rehearing, 155 Wash. 422, 284 P.
796 (1930) (third class cities); Othello v. Harder, 46 Wn. 2d 747, 284 P.2d 1099 (1955)
(towns).
30. WASH. Rzv. CODE chs. 35.23 (1965) (second class cities), 35.24 (1965) (third class
cities), and 35.27 (1965) (fourth class cities, i.e., towns); and WASH. REv. CODE§§ 36.01.010 (1963) and 36.32.120 (1963) (counties).
31. State ex rel. Hill v. Bridges, 87 Wash. 260, 151 P. 490 (1915) ; Pacific First Federal
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn. 2d 347, 178 P.2d 351 (1947).
For a pre-Nelson discussion of the legal powers of Washington dries and towns see
BUREAu or GOVERNm.ENTAL RESEARC.. AND SERVIcES, Muqci.pAL GOvERNxENE nT THE
STAT OE WAsHINGTON 6-34 (Report No. 149, 1962); Trautman, supra note 17.
32. WASr. REV. CODE ch. 35.63 (1965), based on ch. 44 [1935] WAS H. Szss. LAWS 115
[hereinafter cited as the Planning Commissions Act].
33. WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.63.080 (1965) authorizes the exercise of zoning power
by those municipalities operating under the planning enabling act. WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 36.70.930 (1963) provides that WASH. RMv. CODE ch. 36.70 is an alternative to WAsr.
REv. CODE ch. 35.63 for counties.
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to exercise the powers outlined in the statute. The planning commission
operates as a research and fact-finding agency, preparing reports and
recommendations on land use subjects, including proposed comprehen-
sive plans of zoning regulations and amendments thereto.34 The council
or board, by ordinance or resolution, may "affirm, modify, or disaffirm"
any decision of the planning commissionI 5 and may regulate the
municipality's physical development.36 Regulations are to be enacted
pursuant to a comprehensive plan, the general purposes of which are
specified in the statute.37 The tenor of the statute is permissive,"s and
there is a lack of specificity regarding the form and content of the
comprehensive plan and its precise relationship to the zoning regula-
tions enacted by a municipality.
2. The Optional Municipal Code
The recently enacted Optional Municipal Code 9 outlines the powers
34. WAsHr. REV. CODE §§ 35.63.060 (1965), 35.63.120 (1965).
35. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.63.100 (1967), and 35.63.120 (1965).
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.100 as amended by ch. 144, § 8 [1967] WAsH. LAWS 1ST Ex.
SESS. 2289, clarified the location for filing of the zoning maps and plats referred to by a
zoning ordinance amendment. Certified copies of the maps and plats are to be filed with
the county auditor when the amendment was adopted by county resolution, and with
the city clerk when adopted by city resolution or city ordinance. There must be strict
compliance with these filing requirements. The 1967 amendment also allowed cities to
adopt comprehensive plans by resolution.
36. A full arsenal of regulatory land use power is outlined in the statute. WAsHr. REy.
CODE § 35.63.080 (1965) provides that a city council or board of county commissioners
may regulate and restrict the location and the use of building, structures and land
for residence, trade, industrial and other purposes; the height, number of stories,
size, construction and design of buildings and other structures; the size of yards,
courts, and other open spaces on the lot or tract; the density of population; the set-
back of buildings along highways, parks or public water frontages; and the sub-
division and development of land.
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.110 (1965) further provides that the council or board
may divide the municipality or any portion thereof into districts ...establish
official maps .. . and .. .regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration, repair or use of building structures on land.
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.090 (1965) states that the comprehensive plan shall be
concerned with
the physical and other generally advantageous development of the municipality and
shall be designed, among other things, to encourage the most appropriate use of land
...lessen traffic congestion ...secure safety from fire ...provide adequate light
and air ...prevent overcrowding ...promote a coordinated development of the
unbuilt areas ...encourage the formulation of ... community units ...conserve
and restore natural beauty ...facilitate the adequate provision of transportation,
water, sewerage and other public uses and requirements.
38. Shelton v. Bellevue, 73 Wn. 2d 28, 435 P.2d 949 (1968). See note 26 and accom-
panying text, supra.
39. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35A.63 (1967) [hereinafter cited as the Planning En-
abling Act]. Under this chapter a city or town may abandon its statutory classifica-
tion and elect to become a noncharter "Code city." Cities over 10,000 in population may
become a "charter Code city." WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.01.035 (1969).
600
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of cities electing to become "Code" cities.40 The planning and zoning
powers outlined in the statute are broader than those described in
the Planning Commissions Act.4 On the other hand, every Code city
"shall" order the preparation of a comprehensive plan by its planning
agency,42 and both mandatory and optional elements of the compre-
hensive plan are specified.43 Because the statutory grant of authority
refers to the enactment of the zoning ordinance after the comprehen-
sive plan has been approved and provides that the comprehensive plan
"shall" serve as a basic source of reference for future legislative
activity," there is good reason to believe that the plan must be separate
and distinct from zoning regulations.45
The planning agency may be "any person, body or organization
designated by the legislative body to perform a planning function
.*.. )46 It is to be created by ordinance, and the local legislature
may "provide for its membership, organization, and expenses . . . 17
The agency is to have advisory and "such other powers and duties
as shall be provided by the ordinance." 48
After approving the comprehensive plan, 9 the Code city's legislative
40. Planning and zoning authority is granted in WAsr. REV. CODE § 35A.63.100
(1967).
41. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35.63 (1965).
42. WASHr. REV. CODE 9 35A.63.060 (1967).
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.63.061 (1967) (required elements):
The comprehensive plan . . . shall include a recommended plan, scheme, or de-
sign for each of the following elements:
(1) A land-use element that designates the proposed general distribution, general
location, and extent of the uses of land....
(2) A circulation element consisting of the general location, alignment, and ex-
tent of existing and proposed major thoroughfares, major transportation routes, and
major terminal facilities ...
WAsH. REv. CODE § 35A.63.062 (1967) lists these optional elements: conservation;
open space, park, and recreational facilities; transportation; public use; public utilities;
redevelopment or renewal; urban design; and "[olther elements . . ." deemed important
by the local zoning authority or "essential or desirable" in coordinating public services
and programs.
44. WASH. REv. CODE § 35A.63.080 (1967): . . . [The] parts and modifications [of
the comprehensive plan] shall serve as a basic source of reference for future legislative
and administrative action . . .
49. An exception may exist as to those Code cities which elect to operate under a
valid charter provision, since WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35A.63.130 (1967) and 35A.63.160
(1967) provide Code cities with a savings clause and a rule of liberal construction, and
since Nelson v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 862, 395 P.2d 82 (1964) held that a first class
charter city could zone apart from any statutory authority. See notes 22-26 and accom-
panying text, supra.
46. WASH. REv. CODE § 35A.63.010 (1967).
47. WASH. REv. CODE § 35A.63.020 (1967).
48. Id.
49. See note 43 supra.
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body may give it effect "by ordinance or other action."5 Appropriate
zones may thus be established by ordinance, but no zoning ordinance
or amendment thereto may be enacted prior to a public hearing before
the planning agency or board of adjustment or "such other body as
the legislative body shall designate."'"
3. The Planning Enabling Act
Counties may zone under R.C.W. 36.70,52 which contains more
specific guidelines for planning and zoning than either of the two
statutes discussed above. Under this statute, the county planning
agency shall prepare a comprehensive plan,5 3 and before any changes or
additions to the plan are made by the board of county commissioners,
they must first submit the proposals to the planning agency for a
report and recommendation.54 In recognition of the large areas to be
planned and zoned by counties, the legislature has provided for in-
terim zoning whereby the county may adopt a zoning map without
following the time-consuming procedures required for the final zoning
maps. 5
5
Zones may be established by ordinance; 56 however, the planning
commission must hold at least one public hearing prior to recommend-
ing an ordinance or amendment 57 to the county board, and the recom-
mendation must be accompanied by findings of fact and reasons for
the action.58 The board, upon receipt of the proposal, must call a
public meeting, at which the board may adopt or reject the official
control or amendment.59 If the board decides to change the proposal
it must first hold a public hearing, adopt findings of fact, and state
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.63.100 (1967).
51. Id.
52. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70 (1963) (based on ch. 201 [1959] WASH. SEss. LAws
891). The statute also authorizes creation of regional planning bodies. See notes 71-74 and
accompanying text, infra.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.320 (1963).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.430 (1963).
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.790 (1963). The function of an interim zoning map is
to preserve the land-use status quo pending enactment of a final zoning map. By pre-
venting the vesting of uses through the interim device while the comprehensive plan and
final zoning ordinance are still inchoate, the county is able to keep its land area unspoiled.
See Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 729, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
56. WASHr. REV. CODE §§ 36.70.570, -. 750, -. 760 (1963).
57. WASH. REv. CODE § 36.70.580 (1963).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.600 (1963).
59. WAsH. REV. CODE § 36.70.620 (1963).
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reasons for its conclusions prior to the adoption of the changes. 0
The board itself may initiate consideration of an ordinance to estab-
lish or amend an official control if the board first refers the proposal
to the planning agency"1 for a report.6 2
4. The Substantial Compliance Doctrine
Shelton v. City of Bellevue63 established a rule which suggests the
standard by which the courts will enforce compliance with the pro-
visions of the three basic zoning statutes. The defendant, as a third
class city, had established a planning commission and had purported
to begin acting under R.C.W. ch. 35.63.64 Plaintiff obtained a ruling
from the trial court that since the city had not strictly followed the
provisions of the statute in adopting its comprehensive plan, the zoning
ordinance regulating the use of the plaintiff's land was void. 5 The
court concluded that a municipal zoning authority must comply with
the procedural requirements imposed by the statute under which it
chooses to act, but went on to distinguish between two standards for
adequate compliance. When a municipality is performing a regulatory
function, such as passing an amendment to the zoning ordinance which
will alter the classification of or restrictions upon land, strict compliance
with the applicable statutory procedural requirements is mandatory.66
But when the municipality is exercising a non-regulatory function,
such as the adoption and filing of a comprehensive plan, only sub-
stantial compliance with statutory procedures is required. Accord-
60. WAsu. REv. CODE § 36.70.630 (1963).
61. VAsH. REV. CODE § 36.70.020 (13) (1963).
62. VAsH. REV. CODE § 36.70.640 (1963).
63. 73 Wn. 2d 28, 435 P.2d 949 (1968).
64. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 35.63 (1965); discussed at notes 32-38 and accompanying
text, supra.
65. Plaintiff had petitioned the city for a reclassification of the zone to allow him to
construct a service station. Following hearings, his petition was denied; plaintiff then
sued for an injunction on the ground that the ordinance was void.
66. See State v. Thomasson, 61 Wn. 2d 425, 378 P.2d 441 (1963) (zoning ordinance
not effective until map referred to in ordinance fied with county auditor as required by
WAs H. REv. CODE § 35.63.100 (1965)) ; State ex rel. Kuphal v. Bremerton, 59 Wn. 2d 825,
371 P.2d 37 (1962) (zoning amendment not effective until zoning maps certified and filed
in accordance with terms of original ordinance).
67. The city council had amended its comprehensive plan by resolution instead of by
ordinance, but later reenacted the plan by ordinance pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE
§ 35.63.100 (1965) ; the ordinance changing plaintiff's land's classification was not timely
filed pursuant to WAsHr. REv. CODE § 35.63.100 (1965); and maps were not published
pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 35.24.220 (1965).
Thus, under the distinction set forth in Shelton, there need be only substantial corn-
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ingly, the zoning ordinance which was challenged in this case was
upheld. It appears that the substantial compliance doctrine applies to
all three of the basic zoning statutes.68
II. THE CONTROL OF ZONING PAROCHIALISM
While the discussion above indicates that the legal framework for
land use control gives virtual autonomy to municipalities to determine
the substantive content of zoning ordinances, a number of Washington
statutes provide for regional and state planning. 9 Federal statutes
provide some muscle to these laws by making federal grants contingent
on cooperation with regional and state authorities. Part II will an-
alyze the relationship between state and federal statutes, and discuss
the possibility of judicial control of zoning parochialism.
pliance with the requirements that there be at least one public hearing on the plan in the
planning commission, that notice of time and place be published once in the newspaper
of general circulation, and that the plan he filed with the county auditor or city clerk.
The Washington legislature has ensured that if a city decides to become a Code city
under the Optimal Municipal Code, and to zone and plan pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 35A.63, it need not fear that a zoning ordinance will be voided because of a pro-
cedural defect in the development of a comprehensive plan. WASH. REv. CODE § 35A.63.
080 (1967) provides:
Provided Further, That no procedural irregularity or informality in the considera-
tion, hearing, and development of the comprehensive plan or a part thereof, or any
of its elements, shall affect the validity of any zoning ordinance or amendment thereto
enacted by the code city after the approval of the comprehensive plan.
68. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35.63 (1965), discussed at notes 32-38 and accompany
text, supra; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35A.63 (1967), discussed at notes 39-51 and accom-
panying text, supra; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70 (1963), discussed at notes 52-62 and
accompanying text, supra. Attention should be given to the different treatment which is
afforded to the comprehensive plan under these statutes; it will be remembered that in
the latter two statutes the provisions relating to comprehensive plans seem to require
a fairly detailed document.
Shelton also held that a comprehensive zoning ordinance satisfies the statutory require-
ment that "all regulations shall be worked out as parts of a comprehensive plan," even
though no separate plan has been drawn up. This rule seems inapplicable to WASH.
REV. CODE chs. 36.70 and 35A.63. In the latter statutes, the comprehensive plan is to
serve as a "basic source of reference" for future zoning activity. Moreover, by specifying
that circulation and land-use elements are mandatory parts of the comprehensive plan,
the legislature seems to have intended that a plan separate from the zoning regulations
themselves be prepared. But see note 45 and accompanying text, supra.
69. For a summary of Washington zoning law, written for use by local zoning
authorities, and including a summary of regional legal controls, see BGRS Report, supra
note 27.
For a survey of law in other jurisdictions, see Comment, The Regional Approach to
Planning, 50 IOWA L. REV. 582 (1965).
For a general introduction to the problem of state control of local zoning, see Becker,
Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1; Beckman & Ingraham, The States and Urban Areas, 30 LAW & CONTENT.




Intermunicipal cooperation in land use planning is authorized by
Washington's zoning statutes,70 and regional planning is a proper pub-
lic purpose for the expenditure of municipal funds.71 Municipalities
may participate in regional planning through a regional planning com-
mission which can be created by the formal consent of all members. 2
A regional planning commission may accept state and federal grants,
conduct studies, make reports, and "carry on a planning program" for
the region," but it may not promulgate official controls such as zoning
ordinances.74 Where there is no regional planning commission, munic-
ipal planning commissions may still cooperate with each other, the
various public agencies of the state, or the federal government.75
Alternatively, municipalities may establish and organize a regional
"conference" under Wash. Rev. Code ch. 3 6.64.11 The authority of such
a conference is considerably greater than that of a regional planning
commission. A conference may study regional problems of mutual
interest, including problems relating to land use, and may formulate
recommendations for review and action by member municipalities.77
Regional conferences are authorized to finance regional studies by con-
tract with federal, state or municipal governments or by grants from
the state or federal governments. 8
The Interlocal Cooperation Act of 1967 (ICA)79 provides that °
Any power or powers, privileges or authority exercised or cap-
able of exercise by a public agency8' of this state may be exercised
... jointly with any other public agency of this state having the
70. WAsH. REv. CODE chs. 35.63 (1965), 35A.63 (1967) and 36.70 (1963).
71. WAsH. R.v. CODE § 36.70.015 (1963).
72. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70.060 (1963); 35A.63.040 (1969); 35.63.070 (1965).
73. WAsH. REv. CODE § 36.70.060 (1963).
74. Id. See WAsH. REv. CODE § 36.70.020 (11) (1963) (defining "official controls"),
and WAsH. REv. CODE § 36.70.560 (1963) (giving examples of official controls).
75. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 35A.63.030 (1969); 35A.63.050 (1967); 35.63.060 (1965).
76. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.64 (1965).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.64.080 (1965).
78. WVASH. REv. CODE § 36.64.100 (1965).
79. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 39.34 (1967).
80. WASH. REv. CODE § 39.34.030 (1967).
81. Defined by WASH. REv. CODE § 39.34.020 (1969) to include
•.. any city, town, county, public utility district, port district, fire protection district,
school district or metropolitan municipal corporation of this state; any agency of




[same] power or powers, privileges or authority, and jointly with
any public authority of any other state or of the United States
If the subject of agreement is land use planning or zoning, the agree-
ment must be submitted to the State Planning and Community Affairs
Agency for comment before implementation. However,
8 2
Such comments shall not be binding upon the parties to the pro-
posed agreement but may be used by the parties to determine
the advisability of adopting, rejecting or amending the proposed
agreement.
The legislature intended that the ICA supplement authority granted
by any other law, so it does not preempt or supercede any existing
powers or authority.83
The Washington Office of Program Planning and Fiscal Manage-
ment performs some of the functions formerly performed by the State
Planning and Community Affairs Agency, including the preparation
of a state comprehensive plan which is to serve as a guide for "private
activities and public programs at all levels of government." 4 The Office
also aids municipalities and regional planning agencies for interstate
planning.85 The Office coordinates all aspects of state program planning
including "intergovernmental coordination and cooperation."86
The State Planning and Community Affairs Agency continues to
coordinate state programs on community affairs for land use and
land use planning relative to federal grant and loan programs8 7 and
ensure that public works are "consistent with local, regional and state
comprehensive plans and policies. '8 8 All local comprehensive plans or
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.120 (1967).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.100 (1967). In other words, the statute is intended to
operate only as an alternative to provision for joint municipal and regional cooperation
in the other statutes discussed in Part IIA of this Comment.
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.63A.070(2) (1967).
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.63A.070(5) (1967).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.41.110 (1969). See WAsH. REV. CODE ch. 43.63A (1967).
There are ambiguities in this section of the amendment relating to the transfer of powers
from the State Planning and Community Affairs Agency (SPCAA) to the Office of
Program Planning and Fiscal Management (OPPFM). The OPPFM is to coordinate
intergovernmental cooperation, yet apparently is not the agency which reviews local
amendments to comprehensive plans. Questions such as these are to be resolved by
certification to the agencies by the governor. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.41.960 (1969).
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.63A.080(1) (1967).
88. WASH. RV. CODE § 43.63A.080(1)(a) (1967).
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amendments thereto, 9 proposed subdivisions ° under consideration by
any municipal corporation or governmental conference, and intergov-
ernmental contracts under the ICA which relate to specified subjects 9'
"must" be filed with the Agency for review and recommendation
prior to adoption, but failure to fie does not invalidate any such
proposal. The legal "must" turns out to be a moral "should.) 92
In qualified areas93 of Washington, municipalities may join together
to act as a metropolitan municipal corporation, which may perform
any or all of the functions of sewage disposal, water supply, public
transportation, garbage disposal, development of parks and parkways,
and metropolitan planning." In those metropolitan municipal corpor-
89. WAsH. REv. CODE § 43.63A.110 (1967), provides that:
Failure of any county, city, or other municipal corporation to comply with the provi-
sions of this section, shall not invalidate any comprehensive plan or any amendments
thereto, otherwise enacted according to law.
90. WAsH. REv. CODE § 58.17.270 (1969).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.120 (1967).
92, If the state were to have prior notice of such a proposal which had not been sent
to the SPCAA, it is conceivable that the courts might enjoin its adoption by the munici-
pality until it was sent to the state agency. Practically speaking, however, this is no
solution to the problem under consideration, since (a) it would be nearly impossible to
learn of all such measures soon enough, (b) state approval is not required, and (c)
failure to notify the state agency would not invalidate the proposal.
93. The statute provides that:
Any area of the state containing two or more cities, at least one of which is a
city of the first class, may organize as a metropolitan municipal corporation for the
performance of certain functions, as provided in this chapter.
WAs H. REV. CODE § 35.58.030 (1965).
94. WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.58.050 (1965).
Where planning is authorized, the corporation could have the power:
(1) To prepare a recorded comprehensive land-use and capital facilities plan for
the metropolitan area.
(2) To review proposed zoning ordinances and resolutions or comprehensive plans
of component cities and counties and make recommendations thereon. Such proposed
zoning ordinances and resolutions or comprehensive plans ... may not be adopted
until reviewed and returned by the metropolitan council .. . together with [the
metropolitan planning staff's] findings and recommendations ....
(3) To provide planning services for component cities and counties upon request
and upon payment therefor by the cities or counties receiving such service.
%VASH. REV. CODE § 35.58.310 (1965).
At the January 13, 1958, election, the first metropolitan municipal corporation was
created under this statute, the South Snohomish County Metropolitan Municipal Corpo-
ration, and included Everett, Edmonds, Mountlake Terrace, Woodway, Mukilteo, and
Lynnwood. BuRAu OF GovERzaTAx, REsEARcH AND SEwvicEs, Mus-ciPAL GOVEERVMNT
nr i STATE OP WASXMIGTON 275 (Report No. 149, 1962). Its sole function was plan-
ning: "The purpose of forming this Metro was to prevent the southern portion of
Snohomish County . . . from being included within the proposed boundaries of the
Seattle Metro."
Seattle's Metro, formed September 9, 1958, has within its boundaries at this date
approximately 898,000 persons. It encompasses the following cities: Bellevue, Bothell,
Kirkland, Lake Forest Park, Medina, Mercer Island City, Redmond, Renton, and Seattle;
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ations which are authorized to plan, all proposed zoning ordinances
and amendments to comprehensive plans of member governments
must be reviewed prior to adoption by the metropolitan council and
planning staff.9" However, the corporation is of limited utility in the
solution of intermunicipal land use conflicts since it has no power
to institute and administer land use controls.
In conclusion, the statutory scheme for inter-municipal land use
planning can be effective only with the voluntary cooperation of local
governments. As for important problems of land use affecting large
areas, the legislature tends to take them into consideration piecemeal. 6
At most such legislation97 will introduce a regional or state perspec-
tive to the solutions of the particular problems involved. But such
controls are often created after the fact, a product more of startled
reaction than thoughtful anticipation. Finally, the evils sought to be
regulated are ensnarled with myriad land use problems over which
municipalities currently exercise virtually autonomous power.S
and the following towns: Beaux Arts, Clyde Hill, Hunts Point, Mercer Island Town, and
Yarrow Point. It is empowered to perform sewage and drainage control functions, but
in fact has to date left drainage problems to member governments.
95. WASH. REv. CODE § 35.58.310 (1965).
96. For example, Ch. 62, [1970] WAsH. LAWS 1ST Ex. SESS., effective July 1,
1970, creates a single state agency to aid in the management of state air and water
pollution. The Department of Ecology is
. . to undertake, in an integrated manner, the various water regulation, manage-
ment, planning and development programs now authorized to be performed by the
department of water resources and the water pollution control commission, the air
regulation and management program now performed by the state air pollution
control board, the solid waste regulation and management program authorized to
be performed by state government . . . and such other environmental, management
protection and development programs as may be authorized by the legislature.
Id. at § 2. The legislature recognized it to be the public policy of the state
.. that it is a fundamental and inalienable right of the people of the state of Wash-
ington to live in a healthful and pleasant environment and to benefit from the
proper development and use of its natural resources. The legislature further recog-
nizes that as the population of our state grows, the need to provide for our increas-
ing industrial, agricultural, residential, social, recreational, economic and other needs
will place an increasing responsibility on all segments of our society to plan, coordi-
nate, restore and regulate the utilization of our natural resources in a manner that
will protect and conserve our clean air, our pure and abundant waters, and the
natural beauty of the state.
Id. at § 1.
97. See e.g., Senate Bill No. 6, 41st Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1970), and House Bill No.
58, 41st Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1970), on state regulation of the management of seacoast
land; Engrossed House Bill No. 15, 41st. Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1970), and Senate Bill
No. 139, 41st Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1970), on the regulation of surface mining; and Senate
Bill No. 214, 41st Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1970), on the dispersion of industries.
98. Patterns of residential zoning can be taken into account, but cannot be established




Under the Model Cities Act of 1966,11 applications by local govern-
ments for many types of federal grants"'0 must be reviewed by a
qualifying, state-authorized "areawide agency"'' and must be sub-
mitted to the proper federal agency together with the comments and
recommendations of the areawide agency. 02 The comments and recom-
mendations of the areawide agency and a statement by the applicant
that such comments and recommendations have been considered'03
shall ... be reviewed by the (federal) agency .. . for the sole
purpose of assisting it in determining whether the application is
in accordance with the provisions of Federal law which govern
the making of the loans or grants.
In addition, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development is authorized to make grants to state and local public
but cannot be zoned. Regulation of automotive pollution cannot be taken into account
properly until a state or regional agency exists which can study and designate the loca-
tion and inter-relation of not only public and private transportation systems, but business
and residential areas as well.
99. 42 US.C. 3331-3339 (1966). These sections were intended
to provide through greater coordination of federal programs, and through supplemen-
tary grants for certain federally assisted developed projects, additional encourage-
ment and assistance to states and localities for making comprehensive areawide
planning and programming effective. ....
42 U.S.C. § 3331(b) (1966) (a 1968 Amendment changed "tmetropolitan" to "area-
wide").
100. Applications for such federal loans or grants may concern
open space land projects or the planning or construction of hospitals, airports,
libraries, water supply and distribution facilities, sewer facilities and waste treatment
works, highways, transportation facilities, law enforcement facilities, and water
development and land conservation projects within any metropolitan area....
42 U.S.C. § 3334(a) (1968).
101. Such review may be by:
any areawide agency which is designated to perform metropolitan or regional plan-
ning for the area within which the assistance is to be used and which is, to the
greatest practicable extent, composed of or responsible to the elected officials of a
unit of areawide government or of the units of general local government within
whose jurisdiction such agency is authorized to engage in such planning....
42 U.S.C. § 3334(a)(1) (1968).
"Areawide agency" means an official State or metropolitan, regional, or district
agency empowered under State or local laws or under an interstate compact or agree-
ment to perform comprehensive planning in an area; an organization of the type
referred to in section 461(g) of Title 40; or such other agency or instrumentality
as may be designated by the Governor... to perform such planning.
42 U.S.C. § 3338(7) (1968).
102. 42 US.C. § 3334(b)(1) (1968).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 3334(b) (1) (1968).
609
Washington Law Review
agencies which are carrying out "areawide development projects."' 4
Such projects must cover an area wherein.0 5
(1) areawide comprehensive planning and programing provide
an adequate basis for evaluating (A) the location, financing and
scheduling of individual public facility projects . . .whether or
not federally assisted; and (B) other proposed land development
or uses, which . . .have public areawide or interjurisdictional
significance; ...
(2) "adequate" areawide planning and programming arrangements
exist; and (3) projects under comprehensive areawide planning' and
development are in fact underway. 07
Under a 1968 authorization, 08 the Secretary may make "planning
grants" to state and local governments and their state, local, regional
and metropolitan planning agencies. 109 He may also make grants to
metropolitan, district and regional organizations of public officials to" 0
engage in such other activities ... as the Secretary finds necessary
or desirable .. . including, but not limited to, land use, trans-
portation, housing, economic development, natural resources de-
velopment, community facilities, and the general improvement
of living environments.
C. Relationship Between State and Federal Programs
The existing Washington statutes authorizing the voluntary orga-
nization of regional planning agencies, plus the incentives to regional
planning brought by federal grants, will help to promote a regional
point of view in land use decisions, but a review of one such
104. "Areawide development project" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3338(2) (1968) to
mean those projects assisted under the Housing and Urban Development Act 33 U.S.C.
§ 466(j) (Supp. IV 1964); Title II of the Library Services and Construction Act 20
U.S.C. § 355 (1964); Public Health Act 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1964); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. IV 1964); the Federal Airport Act 23 U.S.C. § 120(a)
(Supp. IV 1964); the Urban Mass Transportation Act 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (Supp. IV
1964); Title VII of the Housing Act of 1961, 42 U.S.C. § 1500 (1964); the Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-578 § 5(e), 78 Stat. 901; or the
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3131(a)(1) (Supp.
IV (1964).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 3335(b) (1968).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3338(5) (1968).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 3335(b) (1968).
108. 40 U.S.C. § 461 (1968).
109. 40 U.S.C. § 461(a) (1968).
110. 40 U.S.C. § 461(g) (1968).
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regional organization, the Puget Sound Governmental Conference, in-
dicates that much more in the way of state legislation is needed.
In 1957, four counties111 ratified operation of a regional agency
under then-existing legislation." 2 That same year, the enabling act
was amended to permit cities and towns to participate in regional
planning agencies," 3 and as of May, 1968, four major Puget Sound
cities' 4 and ten smaller municipalities" 5 had become members of the
Conference. In 1965, the members authorized operation under R.C.W.
§ 36.64.080.116
The Conference staff conducts research into various aspects of land
use development for the region," 7 and the members have an oppor-
tunity to participate in long-range regional planning." 8 By 1967, the
Conference had adopted an open space plan, a street and highway
plan, a regional transit plan, and the Seattle-King County metro-
politan area public transportation plan, all as elements of a regional
comprehensive plan." 9 Other projects of the Conference have included
the drawing of maps, compilation of bibliographies, making of popu-
lation and land use studies, and the writing of reports on regional
goals, building codes, zoning ordinances, subdivision ordinances and
wrecking yards.20
The Conference has been designated by HUD, pursuant to the
Model Cities Act, to review and comment on applications from local
111. King, Kitsap, Pierce and Snohomish. A. Williams, Taking Stock: A Report to
the Puget Sound Region on Our First Ten Years and a Look at the Future 4, May, 1968
[hereinafter cited as Williams].
112. Ch. 44, § 11 [1935] Laws of Washington 121 (now WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.63.070
(1965)).
113. Ch. 130, § 1 [1957] Laws of Washington 481.
114. Bremerton, Everett, Seattle and Tacoma. Williamsi supra note 111, at 4. See
also note 124 infra.
115. Auburn, Des Moines, Hunts Point, Kent, Medina, Milton, Mountlake Terrace,
Puyallup, Renton and Sumner. Williams, supra note 111, at 4-5.
116. See discussion at notes 76 to 78 and accompanying text, supra.
117. See, e.g., Darbyshire, A Survey of Subdivision Ordinances in the Central Puget
Sound Region, March, 1967, and Seldomridge, A Survey of Zoning Ordinances in the
Central Puget Sound Region, May, 1967.
118. The conference serves as
an advisory and cooperative body to promote and encourage . . . regional coopera-
tion among city, county, metropolitan, regional, state and private groups in . . .
dealing with regional development problems that are of cohcern to all areas and all
people of the region.
Project Open Space-Summary Report 2, June, 1966.
119. Williams, supra note 111, at 17.
120. Id. at 18-19.
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governments in the region for federal grants. 2 ' The impact of federal
grants on planning agencies became apparent in 1967, after a denial
by HUD of a Puget Sound Governmental Conference application for
a grant. 22 To receive the grant, the Conference was required to, and
subsequently did, reorganize and expand its functions to include
regional transportation planning, formerly the function of the Wash-
ington State Highway Commission.
Although the controls on federal grants and the interchange of
opinion and pooling of knowledge of the members of the Conference
may often be persuasive in getting local governments in the Confer-
ence to take note of regional considerations in their land use decisions,
each municipality is nevertheless legally free to make its own zoning
or rezoning decisions, even if those decisions conflict with the long
range regional plans prepared by the Conference. 24
In conclusion, what is lacking in Washington's control of municipal
land use development and planning, as in most other states, 125 is the
sting of legal compulsion.2 6
As developed thus far in this country, . . . [m]ost acts simply
provide that the regional planning commission is to prepare a plan.
As to what happens thereafter, there is a resounding silence.
While the success of the Puget Sound Governmental Conference may
surpass Haar's general pessimism, current legislation is inadequate,
since even the most successful regional planning agency cannot prevent
zoning practices of local governments which are harmful when viewed
from a regional or state-wide perspective unless (a) the subject of
121. As of 1968. Williams, supra note 111, at 36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3339 (1968).
122. The Conference had by 1967 received a total of $338,530 in federal grants for
planning and research. Williams, supra note 111, at 21.
123. Id. at 36.
124. The threatened withdrawal of Tacoma from the Puget Sound Governmental
Conference is one indication of the tenuous nature of the relationship between the
Conference and the various member municipalities. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec.
12, 1969, at B, col. 1 and Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 17, 1969, at 3, col. 1. Tacoma
Mayor Rasmussen complained that the Conference "has grown in size and power until
now it is telling us all what we can do and what we can't." Seattle Post Intelligencer,
Dec. 12, 1969, at B, col. 2. Pierce County officials have also voiced dissatisfaction with
the Conference. Id. at B, col. 1; The Seattle Times, Dec. 18, 1969, at D 7, col. 2.
125. See Comment, The Regional Approach to Planning, 50 IowA L. Rav. 582 (1965).
126. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515,
521 (1957).
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the practice is the object of a federal grant, and (b) the municipality
decides not to forego the grant.
D. Judicial Controls
The scope of the general welfare invoked to enforce policy on
the use of private land should be coextensive with the respon-
sibility for providing the public services which benefit private land
and whose efficiency is affected by the use of private land ....
[I]n a metropolitan area the words "comprehensive plan" are
meaningless if not self-contradictory when applied to each of
one hundred suburbs.2
One way to introduce controls on zoning parochialism would be
for the courts to require that each municipality give adequate con-
sideration to the general welfare of residents and non-residents alike.
The delegation of police power to local governments by the Washington
constitution 8 and legislature129 should be construed to carry with it
an implied requirement that municipalities consider the general welfare
of all citizens who would be affected by the proposed action. Even
in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 80
the United States Supreme Court recognized "the possibility of cases
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest
of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to
stand in the way."'1
Decisions to this effect have been handed down in other jurisdictions.
127. R. BABcoc, THE ZONNG Gawm 147-48 (1966).
128. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11; see notes 16-31 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 32-62 and accompanying text, supra.
130. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
131. Id. at 390.
The Second Circuit recently held that a municipality has standing to object to an
allegedly unreasonable zoning ordinance of an adjacent municipality. River Vale v.
Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968); noted in 83 HARV. L. REv. 679 (1970). River
Vale, New Jersey, brought suit against Orangetown, New York, for injunction, declara-
tory relief, and damages, alleging that Orangetown's rezone of some wooded land adjacent
to River Vale from "one acre residential" to "office park" deprived it of due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment. River Vale argued that the measure would depress
property values and thus reduce tax revenues, and at the same time increase municipal
expenditures by increasing the volume of highway traffic.
Earlier cases were distinguished as having held only that, as a mere agency of the
state, a municipality cannot assert federal constitutional rights against the state by which
it was created. It may be, therefore, that the court would deny relief where both plaintiff
and defendant are municipal corporations of the same state.
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In Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough of Cresskill,'132 the New
Jersey court upheld an exclusion of all heavy industry from a munic-
ipality noting that'33
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular prop-
erty depends not only on all the conditions . . . prevailing within
the municipality ... but also on the nature of the entire region
in which the municipality is located and the use to which the
land in that region has been or may be put most advantageously.
In Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont,'13 4 the same court
invalidated an ordinance which rezoned property bounded by four
neighboring boroughs from residential to business. The ground for the
decision was that a spot zone had been created, but the court noted
in dictum:135
At the very least Dumont owes a duty to hear any residents and
taxpayers of adjoining municipalities who may be adversely af-
fected by proposed zoning changes ....
Although these cases may seem to reflect a judicial approval of the
type of exclusionary zoning criticised above,' 36 at least the criteria
employed by the court were not parochial; factors which lead a court
to uphold restrictions in one case may result in disapproval of other
restrictions in another case. 37
While there is no Washington case that holds that a municipality
must consider the extra-territorial effects of its decisions, such a rule
is possible in light of Bishop v. Town of Houghton.138 The town of
132. 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
133. Id. 64 A.2d at 349-50. Accord, Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d
412 (6th Cir. 1955) (zoning of an entire municipal corporation for residential purposes
only).
134. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
135. Id. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445 (1954).
136. See notes 5-11, supra.
137. Other cases requiring local governments to consider extra-municipal criteria in-
clude Dowsey v. Kennington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931); Hannifin Corp. v.
Berwyn, 1 II1. 2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1953).
See also Gordon v. Wheaton, 12 Ili. 2d 284, 146 N.E.2d 37 (1957); Schwartz v.
Congregation Powolei Zeduka, 8 I1. App. 2d 438, 131 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1956) (dictum);
Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 fI1. 166, 180 N.E. 767, 771 (1932); Louisville v. Bryan S.
McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Ky. C.A. 1956) (dictum).
138. 69 Wn. 2d 786, 420 P.2d 368 (1966).
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Houghton, operating under R.C.W. ch. 35.63,131 adopted a compre-
hensive plan and passed a zoning ordinance which zoned a sizeable
area of land as R-2, thus permitting the construction of high-rise
multiple-family residential dwellings. Within three years a state high-
way was constructed, severing a portion of this area from the rest
of Houghton. The sole means of access to this strip of land was there-
after through the streets of the neighboring municipalities-the city
of Bellevue and the town of Clyde Hill. When residents of these
municipalities, which had restricted the land adjacent to the strip to
single family dwellings, discovered that a property owner in the strip
was planning to build a high rise apartment, they filed suit to have
the ordinance declared arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to the
prospective builder's property.
The Washington Supreme Court held for the defendant-appellants,
reasoning that the only issue properly before the trial court was
the allegation of arbitrary and capricious conduct of the council in
its denial of plaintiff's petition, that the record brought before Hough-
ton's planners and councilmen amply demonstrated room for an honest
difference of opinion on the question of the necessity for a rezone,
that the trial court had improperly considered new evidence, and that
therefore the decision of the town of Houghton had to be upheld. 40
One major question went unanswered: Must a municipality give
consideration to the welfare of extra-municipal residents? Although
appellants did not make much of the issue, the brief of appellant-
intervenor assigned error to the trial court's determination that plain-
tiffs' 4 '
sue on behalf of a class of property owners all of whom will suffer
material damage in the depreciation of the value of their property
and in the loss of the comfortable use and enjoyment of their
property ....
It is difficult to tell whether the error assigned was to the alleged
139. NVAs. REv. CODE ch. 35.63 (1965), discussed at notes 32-38 and accompanying
text, supra.
140. 69 Wn. 2d at 794, 420 P.2d at 373 (1966).




damage or to the standing of the plaintiffs. 42 But in a footnote
appellant-intervenor comments:143
It is interesting to note that plaintiffs, who are residents of the
Lake Washington Spring Hills area, are not residents of the Town
of Houghton. No resident of the Town of Houghton has protested
the zoning in question nor has requested a rezoning.
Respondent-plaintiff rebutted the implications of the footnote,144 and
asserted public policy inherent in Washington enabling legislation. 43
The court assumed that the plaintiffs had standing, commenting
that 4
when conditions surrounding or in relation to a zoned area have
so clearly changed as to emphatically call for revisions in zoning,
the appropriate zoning authorities are under a duty to initiate
proceedings and consider the necessity of pertinent modifica-
tions ....
Given the circumstances of the litigation, the phrase "surrounding or
in relation to a zoned area" must refer to non-residents in an ap-
propriate case.
Another dictum gives rise to a similar inference :147
(T)he municipality's police power and legislative prerogative ex-
tends, in the ordinary case where the need is reasonably debatable,
to the determination of whether the public interest "requires a
change in zoning laws, and whether or not a change in the char-
acter, conditions or surroundings of a locality has taken place
which requires or justifies a rearrangement of established zones
In restricting itself to the question of arbitrariness and capriciousness,
the court appears to be agreeing with plaintiffs that the "public interest"
142. Standing has been upheld as to non-residents in zoning cases; see, e.g., Hamelin
v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. 1955); Al Walker, Inc. v. Stan-
hope, 23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 372 (1957); Koppel v. Fairway, 371 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1962).
As for the standing of a neighboring municipality to object, see note 131, supra.
On the standing problem generally, see Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in
Zoning, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 294 (1967); Comment, Standing to Appeal Zoning
Determinations: The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 MicEE. L. REv. 1070 (1966).
143. Brief for Appellant-Intervenor, supra note 141, at 6, n.2.
144. Brief of Respondent, supra note 141, at 9-12.
145. WAsHr. REv. CODE §§ 35.63.060 (1965) and 35.63.070 (1965).
146. Bishop v. Houghton, 69 Wn. 2d 792, 420 P.2d 372 (1966) (dictum).
147. Id. quoting 8 McQurLLN, MuNiciPAL. CORPORaTiONS 173 (3d ed. 1965).
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which the municipality must consider includes the effects of local land
use decisions on properties owned by non-residents, where justified by
a "change in the character, condition or surroundings of [the] locality."
It is also possible that the courts will explicitly recognize the public
policy favoring intermunicipal cooperation which is inherent in the
wide range of statutory law148 dealing with inter- and extra-municipal
land use problems. The legislature has expressly noted that149
The growth of urban population and the movement of people
into suburban areas has [sic] created problems of sewage and
garbage disposal, water supply, transportation, planning, parks
and parkways which extend beyond the boundaries of cities,
counties and special districts. [Emphasis added.]
But the courtroom hardly seems an appropriate place to hammer
out regional and state controls on local land use decisions. For one
thing, judicial control would be an after-the-fact affair, a judicial review
of ordinances already established and relied on by the community.
The courts would have to assume that local government would, in light
of judicial review, adequately consider regional and state land use
goals, a task which local governments are simply incapable of per-
forming. Also, the adversary process and the special rules developed
for the adjudication of disputes make the satisfactory resolution of
regional and state land use problems an extreme improbability. At
best, a reliance on judicial control of parochialism would provide a
temporary relief; at worst it could turn the courts into fields for the
waging of political and social battles of the first magnitude.5 0
Indeed, the court may find itself interjected into the troubling
and difficult aspects of metropolitan relations and becoming the
center of controversy between the white-collar, upper-middle-class
148. Notes 70-95 and accompanying text, supra.
149. WAsn. Rav. CoDE § 35.58.010 (1965).
150. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. Rlv. 515,
530 (1957). Contra, Al Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 666, 130 A.2d
372, 377 (1957):
We are not disturbed by the Borough's spectre that continued logical liberalization
of the standing requirement might bring a flood of litigation which would tax our
judicial facilities and unduly burden our governmental subdivisions.
This is weighty authority coming from the court most often cited for the proposition
that a municipality must consider the extramunicipal effects in its zoning decisions. See
notes 132-137 and accompanying text, supra.
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suburb and the increasing minority group, lower-income people
of the central city.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE
If the performance of an activity, or the failure to perform it,
can be damaging to people in other jurisdictions, then the func-
tion is unsuited to local control .... 151
What is needed in Washington is a statutory scheme that establishes
a permanent state institution with legal power to solve the critical
land use problems of the state. The solution of these problems should
not be left up to the voluntary agreement of the member municipalities
of regional planning bodies. Statutes should provide for the delineation
of areas in the state which have unifying regional characteristics and
give a state agency the task of coordinating local, regional and state
plans, the power to nullify those municipal land use decisions which
work to the detriment of the region or state, and, where necessary,
the power to substitute land use decisions of its own.
Article 7 of the draft Model Land Development Code would estab-
lish a permanent Department of State and Regional Planning to con-
sider and solve extra-municipal land use problems. The Department,
members of which would be appointed by the Governor, would study
all matters relevant to state, regional and local land development,
intervene in judicial or administrative proceedings when Code or signi-
ficant state issues are involved, and specify types of developments
which may not be commenced by any governmental agency without
four weeks' prior notice.' 2 It would review all land development plans
and reports, all proposed ordinances and all proposed land develop-
ments of certain types to see if they were consistent with state and
regional plans. If the Department objected to any proposal and the
municipality nevertheless intended to proceed as planned, the latter
would first be required to submit written statements to the Department,
explaining the reasons for its action. Applications of local governments
151. L. GULIcK, TmEE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AmFRIMc IDEAS 43 (1962).
152. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 7-205(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968) [here-
inafter cited as MLDCJ.
618
Vol. 45: 593, 1970
Regional Planning
for federal or other grants would first go to the Department for com-
ment.153
Regional development planse5 4 would be prepared by the Depart-
ment for those regions "which because of physical, economic, social
and governmental characteristics should be planned as a region' 55 and
would establish regional objectives, policies and standards with regard
to such matters as population density, the timing of certain types of
land development, transportation, utility and recreational facilities,
commercial and industrial activities, conservation of land resources,
water and air pollution control, and the equalization of costs and
revenues for local governments. 5 6 Proposed regional development plans
would first be submitted to regional advisory committeeslsr and local
governments, and would require approval by the Governor and both
Houses of the state legislature. With the Governor's approval, the
Department could adopt rules establishing standards to which local
zoning ordinances must conform. If, after a hearing, an Adjudicatory
Board. 8 of the Department determined that a local government was
not complying with these standards, the Department could directly
regulate municipal land development. 59
Where the Department is directly regulating development or pre-
existing uses or structures, it could adopt any regulation which a local
government could impose by ordinance, which regulation would then
supercede inconsistent local ordinances. 6 ° Rules of the Department
could be adopted only after giving notice and an opportunity for all
"interested persons" to make written representations.' 6 '
Minor extra-municipal problems might be resolved under the Code
by a Department rule requiring certain land use proposals to be con-
sidered jointly by more than one municipality and specifying the condi-
153. Id. § 7-206.
154. The section reserved for State Development plans of the MLDC § 7-301, has
not yet been drafted.
155. MLDC § 7-302(1), supra note 152.
156. Id. § 7-302(3).
157. Membership is to include the executive officers of local governments or their desig-
nates, representatives of special districts, and gubernatorial appointees. Id. § 7-103(2) (a).
158. Created within the Department according to MLDC § 7-102; the five members
of the Board are to be appointed by the Governor.
159. MLDC § 7-304(2) (b), supra note 152.
160. Id. § 7-501.
161. Id. § 7-502.
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ions under which the joint proceeding would be held." 2 Consider,
for example, a decision to zone or to rezone an area to allow or disallow
the construction of high-rise apartment buildings. 3 The number of
units allowable per building, access to and from the area, zone classi-
fications of neighboring municipalities, and the distance between the
zone and the municipal border might all be factors employed to deter-
mine the applicability of the rule in a given case.
Under section 7-301 of the MLDC, the state in its own development
plans may desire to withdraw from local regulation some matters
which are not properly the objects of land use decision-making at any
level." 4 For example, there is little doubt that a major purpose of
zoning regulation in many communities is to protect certain low density
residential areas against the intrusion of apartment developments,
mobile homes, minority races and high density single family dwell-
ings.0 5 Where this isolationist policy is pursued with excessive zeal,
the municipality merely protects its own residents at the expense of
of other residents of the state who must remain in overcrowded and
deteriorating neighborhoods." 6' The state may decide to alleviate such
a situation by imposing limits, for example, on the extent to which
municipalities may exercise their zoning powers to maintain an inflex-
ible pattern of single-family residences. Similar steps could be taken
to prevent the absolute exclusion of businesses in what is ordinarily
a wide suburban swath around the city, since it is possible to allow
certain kinds of commercial and industrial uses to operate in residential
areas if they are effectively controlled and their objectionable features
are eliminated. 6 '
162. Joint consideration should take place at the time of proposed reclassification in
order to prevent unnecessary hardship to a landowner who might otherwise have spent
considerable amounts of time and money clearing his property for the proposed use.
163. See discussion of Bishop at notes 138-47 and accompanying text, supra.
164. MLDC § 7-301, supra note 152. Though the provision is not yet drafted, it
should allow for such a decision.
165. See generally R. BABCOCx, Tja ZoN NG GAmm 3 (1966); Freund, Some Inade-
quately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Planning and Zoning, 24 ITL. L. REv.
135, 146 (1929). See also notes 6-10 and accompanying text, supra.
166. Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of the manner in which zoning has been
used to preserve a residential area for citizens of a certain social and economic class and
how these zoning efforts conflict with a basic American belief in equal opportunity and
equal treatment appears in Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW &
CONTMP. PROB. 317 (1955). See also Vickers v. Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129
(1962).
167. R. BABcocK, Tim ZoNNG GAsra 126-33 (1966).
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The arguments favoring a state-centered agency over a proliferation
of regional agencies are persuasive.16 There is no present governmental
power in Washington the territory of which coincides with socio-eco-
nomic reality and which is politically responsible and capable of effec-
tively dealing with regional land use problems.'69 Present law provides
for voluntary cooperation among municipalities, but does not provide
the legal compulsion necessary to guarantee effective regional deci-
sions. 7 0 A state agency would be more flexible and have a broader
viewpoint than regional agencies, and the state could change regional
boundaries if required. Such an agency would be able to deal more
effectively with the other state agencies concerned with land use, make
studies of a more comprehensive nature, and give more effective tech-
nical assistance to local planning and zoning.17' State assistance in
planning, establishment of local zoning and planning agencies, and
drafting of model ordinances would also be more effective. The state,
under Article 7 of the MLDC, would be able to deal with problems
beyond the resources of either regional or local planners. Finally, the
state is uniquely capable of coordinating the land use policies in
municipalities, regions and the state. This coordination could turn out
to be more of a blessing to local governments than at first blush may be
apparent since a unified land use program under state supervision may
prevent much of the upset to local land use planning that might other-
wise come with an unforeseen conflict between state and local goals.
CONCLUSION
It is important to keep in mind the general value of local control
over most substantive zoning decisions. However, some state and
regional control over substance should exist in order to ensure that
the welfare of the general population of the state is adequately con-
sidered. Municipalities have not given adequate consideration to the
inter-municipal, regional, and state-wide implications of their land use
168. These arguments are set out more fully in the MLDC Comments on Article 7,
supra note 152.
169. See discussion of metropolitan municipal corporations at notes 93-95 and ac-
companying text, supra.
170. See discussion of the Puget Sound Governmental Conference, notes 111-124 and
accompanying text, supra.
171. See MLDC Comments to Article 7, MLDC at 189-90, supra note 152.
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decisions, and regional planning agencies presently lack the power to
require compliance with their plans. Washington courts may well rule
that local governments must consider the general welfare of all persons
affected by their land use decisions. Yet problems of regional and
state magnitude require the detailed and continuous administration
that only a permanent state agency can supply.
Accordingly, several features of Article 7 of the MLDC should be
adopted in Washington. A state planning agency should have final
authority on matters of state or regional impact; in extreme cases the
agency should have the power to alter local zoning ordinances. Regional
agencies should be created by the state to plan regionally and to advise
local governments and the state agency on problems of regional scope.
The inclusion of a particular municipality within any given region
should be determined by the state agency, not the municipality. Polit-
ically sensitive decisions of the state agency, such as the establishment
of regional boundaries or adoption of rules pertaining to direct inter-
vention into local land use regulation, should be made subject to
approval by the governor or state legislature.
Washington State is on the verge of a period of dramatic growth.
Unlike some of its sister states, however, it has the opportunity to
learn from the mistakes of others. If the need for more effective re-
gional and state planning was acute in the last decade, it will be
overwhelming in the next. An ounce of legislative prevention is worth
a pound of cure; if the Washington legislature hesitates too long, the
time for prevention will pass, and the lawmakers will have to turn to
whatever after-the-fact remedies they can devise.
G. Bruce Clement*
Egil Krogh, Jr.**
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